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THE PROBLEM  
The low-intensity war of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) against Turkey is a study 
of a conflict where foreign support for the terrorists - or at least a refusal to cooperate 
against them - had become a major aspect of a problem that, between 1984 and 1998, led 
to 10,284 deaths and 16,198 injuries.[1] The struggle cost Turkey an estimated US $8 
billion annually.[2]  
In some cases, the cause of this behavior was a desire to destabilize Turkey. The low-
intensity conflict continued in large part because of its international context. The PKK 
received support from Syria, Iran, Northern Iraq's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
faction and Greece; and whether through extortion or voluntary means, financial and 
moral support came from the Kurdish workers of Turkish citizenship in Europe. The 
PKK also financed its activities by international narcotic trafficking, as well as with 
illegal alien trafficking in Western Europe.[3]  
Turkey's allies are to a large extent supportive of the fight against terrorism, seeing this 
conflict as part of the larger battle with political violence. Still, anti-Turkish lobbies are 
ready to take up the cause of the "oppressed Kurds"; and defining terrorism or accepting 
the insurgents' claims can influence the behavior of democratic states and major forces, 
with the motto that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."  
It must be noted, however, that there is a wide discrepancy between European attitudes 
toward the PKK and diaspora Kurdish nationalism, and the attitudes of Syria, Iran, Iraq's 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Russia. While the issue was approached from the 
viewpoint of human rights and democratization in Europe,[4] it was used by the latter 
group of states/factions (in PUK's case) as a trump card against Turkey.  
In the case of Syria, the objective was to coerce Turkey to allow more water to flow into 
Syria from the Euphrates River. Syria believes that the transboundary watercourse is 
being hampered by the Southeastern Anatolia Project which is comprised of several dams 
and hydroelectric plants. It was not a mere coincidence that the first attacks of the PKK 
came in 1984, the year when this project became operationalized. Attempts to destabilize 
Hatay (the former Ottoman sanjak of Alexandretta), which was joined to Turkey in 1939 
from Syria-under-French mandate, was another objective, because Syria today, still 
refuses to recognize this loss of territory.  
For Iran, supporting the PKK was a trump card against the alleged presence of the 
Mujahidin-i-Halq opposition in Turkey, as well as part of a policy to destabilize secular 
Turkey for ideological reasons. Although Kurdish nationalism is a challenge to both Iran 
and Turkey, and collaboration against terrorism is a common official goal, accusations 
from Turkey of support to PKK and denials from Iran continue. 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations created a semi-autonomous region in 
northern Iraq by demarcating the 36th parallel as a no-fly zone for Iraq. The region 
houses two major tribal authorities competing for power, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). After 1991, the PKK also tried to bid for power 
in the region. This, in turn, resulted in several Turkish military incursions into the 
territory. These actions invited serious criticism from Baghdad, as well as the West.[5]  
Turkey's relations with Russia were strained in the 1990s over support for the secessionist 
movements in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), namely Turkish 
mercenary support in Abkhazia and Chechnia. Some factions in the Duma retaliated by 
lending support to the PKK, and accommodating Abdullah …calan, the PKK leader, on 
Russian territory after he became a fugitive from Syria in late 1998.  
The problem has many international dimensions. Therefore, the objective of this article is 
to evaluate the role of the international actors and to differentiate the 
Kurdish/Southeastern issue from terrorism in Turkey. The causes of terrorism, diplomatic 
and military aspects of managing terrorism, post-modern dimensions of terrorism and its 
aftermath are discussed. Our first contention is that Kurdish nationalism can only be 
satisfied in a pluralistic society given that the physical, sectarian, linguistic and cultural 
divisions are marked by the Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian borders. The second 
contention is that the Kurdish problem and terrorism are entirely different issues, and 
taking a categorical approach neither helps resolve the problems, nor does it help in the 
fight against political violence.  
The Causes  
Smug in the belief that Turks were the last peoples of the Ottoman Empire to have 
embraced nationalism, the Turkish Republican elite settled down to build a nation state. 
The Republic naturally reflected an ethnic mosaic because of the Ottoman heritage; the 
shrinking borders had brought in Muslim emigres of many different ethnic backgrounds. 
Kurdish nationalism was eschewed both deliberately and sub-consciously. One study 
traces the Kurdish question in state parlance as one of denial of Kurdishness, as well as 
referring to rebellions in terms of banditry, foreign provocation, anti-secularism or tribal 
resistance to central authority.[6] Since these categories involved half truths or imagined 
perceptions, nationalism, in the sense that the Republic defined it, was not to be 
appropriated to any particular ethnic group. The Republicans defined nationalism, not as 
one based on race, ethnicity or religion, but on a common culture of nationality, of being 
united during good times and bad. Nationalism, defined almost in marital terms, was not 
accepted by all Kurds all the time. Kurdish nationalism, although historically manifested 
differently in Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, had a history of its own.[7] 
Perhaps that is why it would be difficult to integrate all Kurds into the Turkish polity. 
Denialism was to make it formidably difficult. Integrative approaches worked in the 
Empire as well as the Republic; but since these policies targeted the upper echelons of the 
Kurdish society, it left out the economically deprived who were entrusted to the mercies 
of tribal chiefs and religious sheikhs. Even as late as the 1990s, although it was widely 
understood that the issue had ethnic and economic roots, giving a name to the problem 
was difficult. Emphasizing the latter, BŸlent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party 
and current prime minister, calls the problem "the Southeastern Question," emanating 
from an impoverished region. Groups, such as TOSAV (Foundation for the Research of 
Societal Problems), argue that the issue arises from the lack of pluralism and democracy. 
TOSAV and others argue that a blend of economic development and accommodation of 
Kurdish identities is needed. Foreign scholars advise Turkey to deal with the problem 
instead of procrastinating, denying and hiding behind the struggle against terrorism, 
especially now that the military has practically won the armed struggle.[8]  
The ethnic situation in Turkey is not a clear division along a Turkish stratum versus the 
Kurds.[9] If anything, it is first and foremost a class struggle between the Kurds 
themselves.[10] The current integration of many Kurds into the Turkish society and into 
the business and political decision-making elite reflects a class distinction; the integrated 
Kurds are invariably big landowners and urbanites.[11] Rebellious elements though, have 
been the religious sheikhs[12] or those who rebel against dire poverty, as in PKK's case. 
Integrative policies were not introduced by the Republic, but by Sultan AbdŸlhamid II 
(1876-1909) when "tribal schools" were established in Istanbul where the children of the 
Albanian and Kurdish tribal leaders were educated. The Sultan wanted to integrate the 
next generation of tribal leaders into the state apparatus, since these schools trained only 
civil and military personnel.[13] Kurdish nationalism was a factor nonetheless. One of 
the diplomat/intellectuals of Kurdish origin, the Ottoman Empire's ambassador to 
Stockholm in 1898, Serif Pasha, represented Kurdish nationalism par excellence.[14] 
However, the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds were frustrated in each country, 
whenever attempts were made to break away.[15]  
Terrorism is an entirely different matter. Between 1965 and 1980, the Turkish state 
mostly struggled against Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups of mixed ethnic backgrounds, 
and managed to subdue them following the September 1980 military coup d'etat. In 1978, 
…calan had formed the PKK along Maoist lines, in an attempt to carry out an armed 
insurrection from rural Turkey and to establish a communist Kurdish state. Whether the 
organization foresaw or got wind of the coming coup d'etat in 1980, …calan had already 
moved the PKK to Syria and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.[16]  
Although …calan defined his struggle as a separatist Kurdish nationalist movement in the 
beginning,[17] it was actually internationalist because of its ideological coloring. And it 
was not surprising that the PKK found much needed foreign support in Syria, a client of 
the USSR at that time. Since the PKK was totally comprised of Kurds, it increasingly 
became identified with the Kurdish issue in the minds of many. Over the years the PKK's 
demands changed from separatism to Islamic solidarity, and then to a call for a federation 
of Kurds and Turks, and later was followed by a demand that Kurdish cultural rights be 
recognized as part of human rights and democratization within Turkey. Meanwhile, 
during the last 15 years of its existence, the changing regional/global conjuncture caused 
PKK terrorism to become internationalized, and it began courting assistance from the 
democratic countries of the West.  
Domestic and Military Aspects of Managing Terrorism  
As a case study of how a terrorist group courts democratic forces, one might examine the 
PPK's relationship with Germany. The large number of Kurdish/Turkish workers in 
Germany who contribute to the PKK implies that the group must maintain that country's 
goodwill. Thus, PKK leader Abdullah …calan increasingly spoke of his aim as 
federalism "on the German model."  
In 1997, in an effort to convince the Germans to lift the ban on the PKK, which they had 
imposed in 1993, …calan publicly promised that the organization would no longer 
engage in violence in Germany. When the spokesperson of the German Ministry of the 
Interior announced that this was not probable, …calan immediately threatened Germany 
by stating that the PKK was working with members of the Red Army fraction, a German 
terrorist organization.[18] This alternation between moderate appearences and a quick 
resort to threats of violence, when thwarted, is characteristic of terrorist groups. Likewise 
the September 1998 announcement of …calan regarding a ceasefire, a discourse which 
was ornate with respect for human rights and Turkey's territorial integrity, stated that the 
PKK had no separatist claims. This again points to the fluidity of the terrorist approach.  
The high priority on public relations is another area for exploitation. In Belgium, the 
PKK operated MED-TV, an international television channel, which was temporarily 
closed in 1997 when Turkish diplomats convinced the Belgian security forces that it was 
a money-laundering operation. Today the PKK still has studios in Brussels and England 
in which they use transponders to relay programs to a commercially owned satellite. By 
1999, another temporary closure led to the establishment of yet another TV channel 
(CTV) through the same conduits, but now its discourse was changed from promoting 
terrorism to promoting human rights.  
The G-7 Ottawa Ministerial meeting, Sharm al-Shaykh Summit, G-7 Lyon Summit (June 
1996) and the Paris Ministerial Conference (July 1996) reflected the increasing 
importance attached to fighting terrorism on a multi-state basis. Turkey noted with 
pleasure that all these measures were close to its positions with regard to fighting 
terrorism. For example, the calls to prohibit the use of charitable, social or cultural 
associations by terrorists as a cover for their own activities, to take measures against 
terrorist fundraising and or extortion, and last but not least, efforts to prohibit the use of 
the political asylum process for persons implicated in terrorist activities, all corresponded 
to Turkey's position. In January 1997, the European Union defined terrorism by equating 
terrorism and violence. Accordingly, a resolution which passed in the European 
Parliament calls for diplomatic, political and economic sanctions against countries which 
support terrorism.[19]  
Even the direct military aspects of fighting terrorism have taken on international 
dimensions as the PKK used both Iraq and Syria as safe havens. During a May 1997 
offensive into northern Iraq, the Turkish military captured tons of food, arms and 
ammunition while inflicting heavy casualties on the PKK. Two Turkish helicopters were 
downed by SA-7B missiles. These latter arms were traced back to a 1991 smuggling 
operation through the Bosphorus which had caused a diplomatic crisis between Iran and 
Turkey. Tehran had declared that the unmarked military cargo, as well as the chemical, 
acetyl acid anhydride (legally used in tanning hide), belonged to Iran. The Istanbul State 
Security Court ruled that the captured ship, Cape Maleas, was being used for 
international arms and drug smuggling; but the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeal 
overruled that decision, and the cargo continued onto Iran. Six years later the same 
missiles, guns and acetyl acid anhydride (also used in making heroin from morphine) was 
discovered in the PKK camps of north Iraq by the Turkish military during the May 1997 
cross-border security operation.[20]  
The major difference in this latter military operation, when compared with the previous 
ones, was that neither Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kudistan Democratic Party, nor 
Jalal Talabani, of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan objected; however, all of the Arab 
countries and Iran did protest. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to bring the 
KDP and PUK together in what was called the "Ankara Process." This was an attempt to 
stop their mini-wars and work toward stability in northern Iraq. In the process, Ankara 
seemed to have convinced the Kurdish leaders that if their territories should be cleansed 
of the PKK, Turkey could extend them meaningful economic support.[21] In contrast to 
the KDP, however, the PUK refused to fight the PKK. Later the PKK militants took 
refuge in PUK-controlled territory and, along with the PUK, launched attacks on the 
KDP fighters, as reported the the KDP spokesman in Ankara. Talabani's perplexing 
behavior may only be explained in terms of his using the PKK card against his KDP 
rivals, perhaps feeling threatened by the past cooperation between Ankara and the KDP. 
Turkish efforts continued, however, with help from the United States and Britain, to 
preserve peace among the Iraqi Kurdish factions and to ensure the exclusion of PKK 
from the territory they controlled.[22] In September 1998, the two Iraqi Kurdish factions 
were brought together in Washington, DC to be persuaded to end their civil war. Control 
of the PKK may have been only a byproduct of this meeting. However, since no Turkish 
official was invited to the meeting, it raised suspicion in Turkey as to whether the US 
supported an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, or worse yet, a Kurdish state. Suspicion 
lingered even though the US reiterated that this was not the case.  
The Turkish army made clear that a solely military success was impossible. An end to the 
conflict required resolving the southeast's socioeconomic ills to reduce support and 
recruitment for the PKK. During the 1996-97 Welfare and True Path party coalition, 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan counted on the magic of religion to prevent terrorism. 
His deputy, Tansu ‚iller discounted every solution except that of a military triumph, to the 
point that the general staff military executives publicly announced the military had 
already done its part. Given a coalition mired in religious fundamentalism, corruption and 
scandals, a proactive stance awaited the new ANASOL-D coalition (Motherland Party 
and Democratic Left Party and Democratic Turkey Party) in 1998. But the major scandal 
that had erupted in 1996, named after the location where it took place, Susurluk, 
implicated the then-Prime Minister Tansu ‚iller directly in covert operations against the 
PKK and its sympathizers. Some operatives and high level bureaucrats were definitely 
involved in the PKK's lucrative drug trafficking, as they had received kickbacks. 
Diversions may happen in any covert operation, but ‚iller had not even assumed plausible 
deniability.  
Further, she not only had chosen the makeshift counterterrorism operatives from among 
former ultra-rightist terrorists and drug dealers, but also stood by them in the aftermath of 
the scandal that erupted after Susurluk. Currently, some other operatives are in jail and/or 
are being tried in court for many unsolved murders of PKK sympathizers and of 
underworld bosses who allegedly contributed money to the PKK.  
Post-Modern Dimensions of Terrorism  
In November 1996, the Susurluk scandal erupted in Turkey following this single traffic 
accident. In the crashed car were a member of parliament, the Kurdish leader of a pro-
state tribe from the southeast, the only survivor, a former Istanbul police chief, and a 
right-wing terrorist wanted both by Interpol and the Turkish security apparatus. The latter 
was a member of the underworld of ultra-nationalists, gangsters and drug traffickers. As 
Walter Laqueur wrote, it is sometimes becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between politically motivated terrorism and crime.[23]  
Major political figures in the state, from the minister of the interior to the prime minister, 
were also implicated. The situation was compounded when a German State Criminal 
Court judge pointed to a high-level (female) Turkish minister as the "godmother of drug 
smugglers."[24] What had begun as a 1993 National Security Council decision to cut the 
PKK's financial resources, to which narco-smuggling alone brought about US $2 million, 
resulted in suggestions that the government was linked to drug smuggling. 
Counterterrorism received a serious blow, because the efforts of honest officials, who 
tried to combat the problem, were ignored.  
Security sources had seized tons of heroin and other drugs and had arrested 5ll PKK 
members allegedly involved in drug trafficking, the Anatolia News Agency reported. The 
Security Department's Smuggling and Organized Crime Division stated that since 1984, 
security forces had conducted 129 operations against narcotic smugglers directly linked 
with the PKK, seizing more than 2 tons of heroin, 13 tons of hashish, 4 tons and 
morphine and 22 tons of acetic acid anhydride, which is used to produce heroin.[25]  
Thus, terrorism overlapped with crime; and at times it drew into it the very state which 
was supposed to fight against it. International support, whether overtly or otherwise, 
would have paled against the incumbent government's incompetence, had it not been for 
frequently changing coalition governments and the capture of PKK's leader …calan in 
February 1999.[26]  
The Aftermath  
By Autumn 1998, Turkey decided that the time for an international showdown was 
proper and pressed Syria to extradite …calan. At that time there were no Israeli-Syrian 
negotiations going on. The Turkish military had been successful in suppressing the PKK. 
Syria was still on the United States' Department of State list of terrorist states. Lastly, 
Turkey had run out of patience with Syrian denials of harboring PKK and …calan.  
Faced with a possible military threat, Syria complied and …calan's saga as a fugitive 
seeking protection and asylum in sympathetic countries began. This period also marked 
the peak of what was perceived in Turkey as European support for diaspora Kurdish 
nationalism and for the PKK. …calan first flew to the Russian Federation and was 
accommodated, while the Russian government denied the existence of a person under 
that name until the Israeli press confirmed …calan's whereabouts. Then sympathetic 
Italian communist deputies escorted him to Italy, through Greece.  
The Italians put him under house arrest, but refused to extradite him to Turkey because of 
the capital punishment that he might face, although no one sentenced to death had been 
executed since 1984. Germany did not arrest …calan, although there was a warrant for 
his arrest in Germany for having ordered certain murders that had been committed on 
German soil. After seeking and being denied accommodation in the Netherlands, …calan 
flew back to Italy and then on to Greece in a rented airplane. He was at long last 
apprehended in Kenya, while leaving the Greek ambassador's residence, and was turned 
over to Turkish security officials in February 1999. Nairobi promptly requested that the 
Greek ambassador be recalled for having compromised Kenya, and for having lost his 
credibility. The Greek ambassador had hidden the real identity of …calan when he had 
entered Kenya under the auspices of Greek security officers.  
Much international advice followed that a public and fair trial must be held in Turkey. 
The government refused suggestions that Europeans be allowed to send observers, but 
agreed to allow foreign listeners, as well as foreign journalists, to attend the court 
proceedings. Toward the end of the hearings, the State Security Court recalled the only 
military judge, thus making the body of judges all civilian; this had previously been a 
sensitive issue with the Europeans.  
In his lengthy defense, …calan apologized, admitted that he had been wrong in resorting 
to armed insurrection, described the phases PKK had gone through regarding its 
objectives, and concluded that at the present time he wanted Kurdish-Turkish relations to 
be reformulated through further democratization. His emphasis was on peace and 
democracy, as well as cultural rights for the Kurds.[27] The court did not find him 
sincere or convincing, and refuted his peaceful intentions and ceasefire declarations by 
exposing tape recorded wireless orders to the contrary (…calan can only speak Turkish). 
He was convicted and sentenced to death on charges of treason. Whether his execution 
will stay after the appeals processes both at home and abroad is not clear. …calan's 
lawyers have stated that they will take the case to the European Human Rights Court, if 
necessary.  
Pro-PKK riots had followed in Europe as soon as …calan was arrested because of what 
Newsweek termed "a sense of betrayal."[28] But the European streets were silent after 
the court verdict. "With Mr. Ocalan out of the picture," wrote The Economist, "and the 
PKK inevitably in disarray, Mr. Ecevit could try to cut a deal with the Kurds from a 
position of strength."[29]  
"Cutting deals" is not a very realistic expectation, not only because there is consensus 
among the state elite to solve the problems (legal, administrative, social and economic) 
within a national perspective,[30] but also because there is a myriad of contenders 
claiming to represent Kurdish interests. Among these are the PKK, several disapora 
Kurdish groups/parties, and HADEP (People's Democracy Party) in Turkey. A new group 
established by PKK's political wing in Europe (the Peace and Democratic Resolution 
Group) arrived in Turkey on 29 October 1999. Their aim was to obtain political 
recognition from the state, but they were immediately arrested on charges of membership 
in a terrorist organization.[31] Most Kurdish activists in Europe, even if they are pacifists 
like Kemal Burkay, the leader of the Kurdish Socialist platform, are personae non grata in 
Turkey for having been involved in leftist terrorism prior to 1980. HADEP, on the other 
hand, is a legitimate political party. It did not win enough votes to carry representatives to 
the Grand National Assembly in the 1999 general elections, plausibly because there was 
state intimidation against party rallies. But the local elections brought seven HADEP 
mayors to power in southeastern Turkey. In October 1999, President SŸleyman Demirel 
gave an audience to the HADEP mayors, signifying that they were accepted at the highest 
echelons of the state apparatus. The charges that HADEP had faced, which might have 
resulted in the party's closure, were dropped. Both the president and the judiciary 
signalled that representing Kurdish interests should no longer be associated with being a 
dissident. An amnesty law, which will be extended to PKK members who were not 
directly involved in killings, may soon pass, if the coalition partners reach consensus. 
And, there has been a tangible ease in tensions between Turkey and Europe, although a 
recent Italian court decision extended the right of political asylum to …calan, after his 
verdict was passed in Turkey.  
CONCLUSIONS  
…calan's departure from Syria and his eventual capture became a turning point in 
Turkey's foreign relations on the issue of terrorism. Most of Turkey's allies and Russia 
had cooperated by not granting asylum to …calan. The Greek Foreign Minister, 
Theodoros Pangalos, the Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Public Order 
Minister Philipos Petsalnikos, had all resigned at the request of Prime Minister Costas 
Simitis. The Foreign Minister "Pangalos was in charge of the attempt to hide Ocalan at 
the Greek ambassador's residence in Nairobi, Kenya, and find him political asylum."[32] 
The new Foreign Minister, Yorgos Papandreau, seems open to pursue a dialogue with 
Turkey, starting with cooperation on softer issues such as the environment, trade, tourism 
and terrorism. And after the disastrous earthquakes which shook both countries in 
summer 1999, collaboration and mutual assistance for disaster relief was added. Only if 
these confidence building measures between the two states succeed may the larger 
problems concerning the Aegean Sea, no fly-zones and Cyprus be tackled.  
Although the media and leftist parties in the West interpreted the violent demonstrations 
following …calan's capture as universal Kurdish support for him,  
the actual size of demonstrations, however, suggest a carefully coordinated attempt by a 
small group bent on publicity. The following figures are taken from pro-PKK internet 
sources: In Berlin there were 150 protesters, including children; in Frankfurt 50, and in 
Bonn between 20 and 30 - all in a country with half a million immigrants of Kurdish 
origin . . ..[33]  
The numbers were similar elsewhere in Europe.  
The US supported Turkey in its fight against terrorism throughout these years, only 
stating every now and then that human rights should be handled with more care. In fact, 
the US stood out among many of Turkey's allies by identifying the PKK as a terrorist 
organization. "The U.S. government deserves bouquets for its effective pursuit of Ocalan 
and for standing alone among Western nations in supporting Turkey," wrote Alan 
Makovsky, "Washington behaved appropriately in tracking Ocalan and tipping off the 
Turks."[34]  
It is quite possible that Iran, although not under nearly as much pressure from Turkey as 
Syria was, may become reluctant to support the PKK because of its pan-Kurdish 
claims.[35] However, there is another terrorist organization in eastern Turkey, Hezbollah, 
which comprises the pro-Shari'a Kurds that Iran may support, if it is not already doing so, 
because of ideological reasons.  
The Russian Federation and Turkey concluded an agreement in November 1999, 
following Prime Minister BŸlent Ecevit's visit, on cooperation against terrorism. This 
may yet nullify efforts to use the ethnic card against each other. In Russia's case, this 
involves the support extended to the PKK by the Duma; and in Turkey's case, any 
unofficial support for the Chechens. Naturally, no names were mentioned in the 
agreement text. Ecevit's visit was a controversial one because it occurred while Russia 
was bombing Chechen territory, and as many as 350,000 civilians had become refugees. 
While the Turkish prime minister conveyed concern about the plight of these civilians, 
the agreement was indicative that innocent civilians do not fare well in realpolitik.  
A revealing analysis came from an Italian expert on strategy. He offered an explanation 
as to why Europe refused to differentiate between the Kurdish or southeastern issue and 
terrorism. The cause of the strain between the European Union (EU) and Turkey may be 
competition between the EU and US in terms of having a voice in Middle Eastern affairs, 
and the misplaced tactics of the Europeans. It had been a mistake to equate PKK and 
…calan with the Kurdish issue. The bigger picture rested on the European desire to 
acquire political/diplomatic weight in Turkey and the Middle East in proportion to its 
geographical proximity and interests. Currently the US, Turkey and Israel seem to carry 
exclusive influence in the area.[36] If this were the case, the timing could not have been 
more unfortunate. After the 1997 Luxembourg and 1998 Cardiff meeting resolutions, 
which did not mention Turkey as a candidate for EU membership, Turkey had stopped all 
political dialogue with the EU. Therefore, no European country had any leverage over 
Turkey. Even if Turkey had been declared a candidate state, and the Europeans had 
political leverage, it would still be unrealistic to expect that Turkey would ease up against 
what is defined as international terrorism and what the Europeans saw as a human rights 
issue.  
Whatever the reasons for support of or non-cooperation against terrorism abroad, 
challenges to Turkey are far from over. In September 1999, the PKK declared that it 
would abolish the Kurdish parliament-in-exile so that it could join the Kurdistan National 
Congress (KNC), another platform established by the PKK in Amsterdam. KNC is to 
open offices in the US, England and Scandinavia.[37]  
Support for diaspora Kurdish nationalism in the West may continue to strain Turkey's 
foreign relations. However, since the KNC is a pan-Kurdish medium, it may keep the 
West from making excessively bold gestures. Pan-Kurdism involves more than just 
Turkey. Kurds of different Middle Eastern citizenship may reject Kurdish-Turks' 
leadership in this movement; and the concept itself is loaded with unpredictable 
consequences.  
In conclusion, perceptions and misperceptions abound. Turkey is overly sensitive about 
disintegration, commonly diagnosed as the Sevres syndrome (named after the Sevres 
Treaty of 1920, which not only dissolved the Ottoman Empire, but also attempted to 
disintegrate the Anatolian heartland). Western Europeans, especially during the last 
decade, believe that they have reached the highest level of political, economic and 
humanitarian systems possible. They do not want disruption of law and order instigated 
by Kurdish dissidents in reaction to Turkey. Turkey is certainly lucky not to have paid the 
price that Europe has had to pay to reach its level of development, after not only one but 
two disastrous world wars. Turkey only had to deal with the dissolution of an empire, the 
repercussions of which still challenge the state in the form of Kurdish or other 
ethnic/emigre nationalism. Turkey desperately needs to synchronize its free market 
economy with liberal democracy, albeit without compromising the unitary system of 
state. Much fine tuning is required between political/legislative synchronization and 
management of terrorism in Turkey and the world.  
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